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A CASE  STUDY ON THE  LEGAL  IMPACTS OF   
CORPORATE  SUSTAINABIL ITY  PLEDGES 
IN  THE  ALBERTA O IL  SANDS 
Jeffrey Bone* 
ABSTRACT 
Suncor Energy Inc. is Canada’s largest oil and gas producer with significant 
operations in the Alberta oil sands. In its 2010 Sustainability Report, the  
corporation made several long-term environmental pledges. This paper con-
fronts a hypothetical situation involving these environmental pledges. What 
if Suncor’s commitments prove to be effective from an environmental 
standpoint, but they become more costly from a financial perspective than 
Suncor anticipates? In accordance with their statutory fiduciary duties, Sun-
cor directors have a choice to make between two options. First, the company 
could increase or maintain expenditures in order to meet these commitments. 
Second, the company could limit its projected expenditures with the conse-
quence that environmental commitments will not be met due in part to 
financial constraints. This case study applies Canadian corporate statutory  
fiduciary duties to these alternatives and ultimately finds that such pledges do 
not create legal liability for directors when they fail to uphold environmental 
commitments. However, directors may be entitled to follow through on vol-
untary environmental pledges that are more costly than initially anticipated 
without incurring liability from disgruntled shareholders. 
Citation: (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 71. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Government of Canada has encouraged Canadian businesses to 
make environmental sustainability a priority.1 This is at least one reason why the natural 
resource sector has embraced environmental rhetoric. For example, the terms sustainabil-
ity and sustainable development are commonly bandied about in the resource and energy 
industry. 
The “genesis of sustainability was the recognition of increasingly serious and global 
environmental and socio-economic problems resulting from development.”2 In 1987, 
the Brundtland Commission prepared a report on behalf of the United Nations that 
gave “sustainable development” its classic definition: “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.”3  
In the Canadian context, sustainability favours a shift from continued incremental 
degradation of unsustainable practices to gradual recovery through economic and tech-
nological efficiencies and greater ecological rehabilitation.4 At the international level, 
implementing sustainable development was the focus of the 1992 United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, also known as the Earth 
Summit. Several key documents came out of the Earth Summit: the Rio Declaration, a 
statement of general principles needed to achieve sustainable development, and Agenda 
21, a global, national, and local action plan. 
The terms “sustainable development” and “responsible development” are also seen 
in the statements, policies, codes, and regulatory disclosure documents of energy sector 
corporations such as Shell Canada Ltd., Nexen Inc. (wholly foreign-owned by CNOOC 
Ltd.), and Suncor Energy Inc., among others. For example, Shell states that “sustainable 
development” is an integral part of the energy business.5 Nexen defines “responsible 
development” as supplying energy “without compromising the well-being of future 
generations.”6 Suncor’s literature suggests the company conducts its “operations and 
growth plans in a way that enhances social and economic benefits, while striving to 
minimize the environmental impact associated with development.”7 This language has 
appeared verbatim in Suncor’s annual sustainability report for the past several years.8 
                                                                                                                                            
1 See Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “Sustainable Development Strategy 2007-2009” 
(2009), online: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>. 
2 Shawn Denstedt, JoAnn Jamieson & Matthew Keen, Sustainable Development and Environmental Assessment 
Processes (Discussion Paper) (Calgary: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, 2008) at 1. 
3 Brundtland Report: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987) at 43. Named for the Commission’s Chair, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
former Prime Minister of Norway. 
4 See Robert Gibson, “Favouring the Higher Test: Contribution to Sustainability as the Central Criterion for 
Reviews and Decisions under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act” (2001) 10 J Envtl L & Prac 39 at 
42. 
5 Shell Canada Ltd, “Environment & Society” (2013), online: Shell at <http://www.shell.ca>. 
6 Nexen Inc, “Sustainability Report 2012” (2013), online: Nexen <http://www.nexeninc.com>. 
7 Suncor Energy Inc, “Sustainability” (2013), online: Suncor Energy <http://www.suncor.com>. 
8 Ibid. Also see the 2010 Report on Sustainability (21 July 2010), online: Suncor Energy Inc. 
<http://sustainability.suncor.com> [2010 Report on Sustainability]. The Suncor Sustainability Report was 
developed using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 Guidelines and reached an A+ reporting level. 
Note the latest version of the GRI Guidelines is currently G3.1. Global Reporting Initiative, “GRI Sustaina-
bility Reporting Guidelines G3.1 – Reference Sheet” (3 January 2014), online: GRI 
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The following paper discusses the potential liability flowing from the future-
orientated pledges made in Suncor’s 2010 Report on Sustainability, while keeping in 
mind corporate directors’ statutory fiduciary duties contained in section 122(1) of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA).9 I argue that corporate directors do not have a 
duty to consider (or not consider) environmental interests. However, the directors of 
Suncor have a solid legal basis to defend a voluntary sustainability policy even if there is 
no duty that requires it.10 
Using this framework, Part 1 examines whether corporate stakeholders can enforce 
the covenants contained in a sustainability or environmental pledge if it negatively im-
pacts shareholder profit using the example of a Canadian energy company. To this end, 
the case study considers the long-term pledges contained in the 2010 Report on Sus-
tainability of Suncor Energy Inc. and legal regulations concerning reclamation of tailings 
in the Alberta oil sands. 
Part 2 sets out the leading legislation and case law on corporate directors’ fiduciary 
duties in Canada. Important issues arising from the case law include the application of 
corporate citizenship and the business judgment rule as a potential mechanism to shield 
directors from liability when making strategic decisions based on environmental factors. 
Part 3 applies the previous part’s conclusions to the case study. The focus is on the 
legal obligations, if any, that attach to directors of Suncor in relation to their 2010 Re-
port on Sustainability. The Suncor case study demonstrates that corporate sustainability 
pledges do not create legal liability for directors when considering their fiduciary duties 
contained in section 122(1) of the CBCA. Directors acting on behalf of a corporation 
may follow through on an environmental pledge or ignore it without incurring liability. 
Case Study Framework 
Corporate sustainability pledges include all forms of environmental covenants, 
promises, and undertakings.11 There is a contradiction in considering whether a volun-
tary pledge can be legally enforced since it is settled law that a naked promise, without 
more, is not legally binding. However, this case study explores whether corporate direc-
tors can be held legally responsible through their fiduciary duties for voluntary 
sustainability pledges enacted by the corporation.  
Suncor made several of these voluntary pledges in its Sustainability Report, includ-
ing a pledge to accelerate the reclamation of Suncor tailings through a new, internally-
                                                                                                                                            
 
<https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-Quick-Reference-Sheet.pdf>. Further, Suncor uses 
the non-profit group Ceres for input in preparing its sustainability report: 
Ceres is an advocate for sustainability leadership. Ceres mobilizes a powerful network of investors, 
companies and public interest groups to accelerate and expand the adoption of sustainable busi-
ness practices and solutions to build a healthy global economy.  
“Ceres in Brief” (2 August 2 2010), online: Ceres <http://www.ceres.org>. Note that in 2009 Suncor merged 
with Petro-Canada and united under the Suncor brand. The companies amalgamated pursuant to a plan of 
arrangement and exist today as Suncor Energy Inc as a Canada Business Corporations Act company.  
9 Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 122(1) [CBCA]. 
10 The case study explicitly focuses on the decisions of directors; however the same statutory fiduciary duties 
apply to the officers of a corporation under section 122(1) of the CBCA. 
11 Stepan Wood, “Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability” in Benjamin Richardson & Stepan 
Wood, eds, Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 229 at 230. 
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developed technology.12 This process received regulatory approval from the Alberta 
Energy Resources Conservation Board in June 2010.13 Tailings Reduction Operations 
(TRO) is a tailings management technology that involves converting fluid tailings into a 
solid landscape suitable for reclamation. Tailings are a mixture of fine sands, clay, water 
and residual bitumen produced through the oil sands extraction process. When these 
tailings settle, a portion will eventually form mature fine tailings. These tailings have 
historically taken many decades to firm up sufficiently for reclamation.14 TRO speeds up 
the drying process that is already occurring in conventional heavy water-based tailings.15 
Tailings contain toxic contaminants such as heavy metals and acids that break 
down very slowly and therefore pose a long-term threat to the groundwater of the re-
gion. A report published by Environmental Defence concluded that oil sands tailing 
ponds leak more than 11 million litres of contaminated water per day.16 Speeding up the 
reclamation process is therefore important for those concerned with long-term envi-
ronmental contamination.17  
                                                                                                                                            
12 Suncor committed to reduce water intake, increase land area’s reclaimed, improve energy efficiency and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. All of these promises were absolute with the exception of energy efficiency 
which is intensity based. “Suncor Sustainability Report: Sets Four Environmental Goals for 2015” (19 August 
2010), online: Environmental Leader <http://www.environmentalleader.com>. 
13 Energy Resources Conservation Board, News Release, 2010-08, “ERCB Conditionally Approves Suncor 
Plan to Reduce Fluid Tailings (17 June 2010), online: Alberta Government <http://alberta.ca> [ERCB Press 
Release]. Suncor has been researching, developing and testing the TRO technology since 2003. The particular 
project is located 40 km northwest of Fort McMurray. Green Congress, “Suncor Energy Receives Conditional 
Regulatory Approval for Oil Sands Tailings Management Plan; Projected 30% Reduction in Volume” (18 June 
2010), online: Green Congress <http://www.greencarcongress.com>. 
14 Ibid. For a more in-depth review of Suncor’s reclamation techniques concerning liquid fine tailings see 
Melinda Mamer, “Oil sands tailings technology: understanding the impact to reclamation” (2010), online: 
British Columbia Mine Reclamation Symposium <https://circle.ubc.ca>. 
15 TRO is expected to increase reclamation of tailings ponds by “decades and [has] already enabled the cancel-
lation of plans to build five additional tailings ponds at…[Suncor’s] existing operations.” Suncor Energy Inc, 
2010 Annual Report (26 January 2011), online: Suncor Energy Inc <http://www.suncor.com/pdf/Suncor-
English-Annual-Report.pdf> at 5 [Annual Report]. The Sustainability Report states: “We expect the TRO™ 
process to result in reclaimable surfaces 10 years after initial disturbance—the comparable timeframe using 
CT is about 30 years.” 2010 Report on Sustainability, supra note 8 at 12. Elsewhere, Suncor restates that TRO will 
“reduce the time it takes from initial land disturbance to have reclaimable surface to about 10 years—a third 
of what is now the industry standard.” Suncor Energy Inc, 2011 Sustainability Report (July 2011), online: Suncor 
<http://sustainability.suncor.com>. In March 2011, Suncor won a major reclamation award recognizing the 
“importance of long-term corporate commitment to reclamation through innovation and improved reclama-
tion techniques” with TRO. Suncor Energy Inc, Press Release, “Suncor Energy Recognized for Reclamation 
Efforts” (4 March 2011), online: Suncor <http://www.suncor.com>. Furthermore, the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants recognized Suncor in 2010 for its report on sustainability. 
16 Environmental Defence, “11 Million Litres a Day: The Tar Sands’ Leaking Legacy” (December 2008), 
online: Environmental Defence <http://www.environmentaldefence.ca> at 2. 
17 TRO “has significant benefits such as: accelerating reclamation, reducing the need for more tailings ponds 
and reducing the existing inventory of [mature fine tailings].” Mamer, supra note 14 at 1. During the Suncor 
TRO process:  
[Mature fine tailings] is mixed with a polymer flocculent and then deposited in thin layers over 
sand beaches with shallow slopes. This drying process occurs over a matter of weeks, allowing 
more rapid reclamation activities to occur. The resulting product is a dry material that can be re-
claimed in place or moved to another location for contouring and replanting with native 
vegetation, according to Suncor. The Alberta Energy Regulator believes that application of TRO 
will enable Suncor to reduce the volume of fluid tailings remaining at the end of the project life by 
approximately 30%. Further, Suncor’s approved plan by the Alberta Energy Regulator does not 
call for the creation of any new tailings ponds and will allow Suncor to operate five fewer tailings 
ponds and use less space for fluid tailings storage than originally applied for. 
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TRO is advantageous from an environmental perspective for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, TRO eliminates the need for large-scale liquid tailings ponds like the kind that 
were at the centre of the 2010 conviction of Syncrude Canada Ltd. (Syncrude) for caus-
ing the death of approximately 1,600 ducks near the company’s oil sands operations in 
northern Alberta.18 Wildlife, and fowl in particular, are attracted to liquid-based tailings, 
mistaking them for natural lakes. Where TRO has been implemented, a tailings pond’s 
surface is not a pure liquid, and the overall footprint and circumference of the pond is 
reduced. Secondly, Suncor reports that the time it takes for the surface of the tailings to 
be suitable for reclamation and revegetation is reduced from 30 years to 10 years, mak-
ing the entire project less time consuming.19  
The downside is that the technology is very expensive. Suncor spent $670 million 
implementing TRO in 2011, which was about 10% of Suncor’s total capital budget.20 By 
2012, the cost of implementing TRO was over $1.3 billion.21 Former Suncor CEO Rick 
George wrote: “We invested about $250 million developing TRO and will have spent 
another $1 billion by 2013 to install it throughout the operation. That’s a lot of money 
by anyone’s standard.”22 
In addition, TRO technology is still in the process of commercial deployment, and 
the benefits, while promising, are uncertain. There is reasonable concern that Suncor’s 
expectations of TRO technology (or ‘dry tailings’) dramatically reducing reclamation 
time may prove untrue. This possibility was highlighted in a 2009 report on oil sands 
operators, which found “technology undertakings made during the permitting process 
do not always translate to the final project” and “promised commercial-scale dry tail-
ings…seems to be backtracking.”23 On this basis, there is no guarantee that TRO will 
ultimately succeed in reducing the length of time required for reclamation.  
In Suncor’s 2010 Annual Report, the company announced that it was the first oil 
sands operator to “complete surface reclamation of a tailings pond.”24 It took Suncor 
approximately 40 years to reclaim this pond without the aid of TRO. Given that TRO 
is, as yet, an unproven technology, it is unclear on what basis Suncor estimates a 10-year 
window for surface reclamation.25 As of 2013 the company is operating six TRO drying 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Green Congress, supra note 13. 
18 R v Syncrude Canada Ltd, 2010 ABPC 229, 53 CELR (3d) 194. Syncrude was convicted under the Migratory 
Birds Convention Act, SC 1994, c 22 and the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c E-12. 
19 Annual Report, supra note 15 at 5. 
20 See Suncor Energy Inc, 2010 Annual Information Form (3 March 2011), online: Suncor 
<http://www.suncor.com/pdf/3161587_Suncor_Annual_Information_Form.pdf> at 9. 
21 Suncor Energy Inc, TRO Update as part of the 2013 Report on Sustainability (2013), online: Suncor 
<http://sustainability.suncor.com>. 
22 Rick George, Sun Rise: Suncor, The Oil Sands and the Future of Energy (Toronto: HarperCollins Publisher Ltd, 
2012) at 170. 
23 Michelle de Cordova & Jamie Bonham, Lines in the Sands: Oil Sands Sector Benchmarking (November 2009), 
online: Northwest & Ethical Investments LP 
<http://www.strategywest.com/downloads/LinesintheSands2009.pdf> at 34. 
24 Annual Report, supra note 15 at 3. 
25 Suncor’s speculation on such matters does not necessarily create legal liability if the assumption becomes 
untrue. In order to create legal liability, the assumption would have to be made fraudulently, deceitfully or 
negligently in light of the facts. See Hercules Managements Ltd v Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 SCR 165, 146 DLR 
(4th) 577 for a thorough overview of these principles. (Note that the Hercules case is premised on 3rd party 
auditor liability and not direct corporate liability.) 
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systems, compared to four in 2010, and expansion will continue to advance over the 
next three years. By 2012, the cost of implementing TRO was over $1.3 billion.26 
Finally, it is important to note that TRO is not driven entirely by an effort to com-
ply with existing legal requirements. Evidence suggests that Suncor can comply with 
existing legal regulations without the expense that TRO development and implementa-
tion requires. TRO is designed to eliminate tailings effectively and expediently, and in a 
way that meets existing regulations on tailings reclamation. However, the regulator 
responsible for enforcing these reclamation rules and standards does not require com-
pliance by oil sands operators. Thus, if Suncor directors insist on funding TRO, they 
may be vulnerable to disgruntled shareholders who object to corporate spending on an 
initiative that surpasses regulations. 
Directive 074 
Effective June 17, 2013, the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) succeeded the Energy 
Resources Conservation Board. The AER continues to regulate oil sands mining and 
tailings under the Oil Sands Conservation Act.27 Established in 2009, Directive 074 requires 
oil sands operators to reduce the amount of fine tailings going into liquid tailings.28 The 
Directive is concerned with trafficability of fine tailings deposits or, in other words, how 
much weight the tailings can bear after drying.29 These dry deposits must be ready for 
reclamation within five years after deposits have ceased.30 
Oil sands companies must provide a comprehensive plan to reduce the amount of 
fine tailings they store and deposit, in accordance with the above regulations. The plan 
must be approved by the AER. Companies must also provide annual and quarterly 
reports on the progress of their tailings reclamation programs.31 In 2009, Imperial Oil 
Resources Ventures Limited, Canadian Natural Resources Limited, Shell, Syncrude, and 
Suncor submitted plans under Directive 074. By the end of 2010, the AER had ap-
                                                                                                                                            
26 Suncor Energy Inc, TRO Update as part of the 2013 Report on Sustainability (2013), online: Suncor 
<http://sustainability.suncor.com>. 
27 Oil Sands Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-7. 
28 Alberta Energy Regulator, “Directive 074; Tailings Performance Criteria and Requirements for Oil Sands 
Mining Schemes” (3 February 2009), online: Alberta Energy Regulator 
<http://www.aer.ca/documents/directives/Directive074.pdf>. 
29 Terra Simieritsch, Joe Obad & Simon Dyer, Tailings Plan Review: An Assessment of Oil Sands Company Submis-
sions for Compliance with Directive 074: Tailings Performance Criteria and Requirements for Oil Sands Mining Schemes 
(December 2009), online: Pembina Institute and Waters Matter <http://www.water-matters.org/docs/ 
tailings-plan-review.pdf> at 6. 
30 Green Congress, supra note 13. 
31 As noted in an ERCB (as it was formerly known) press release concerning Suncor: “The submission of the 
tailings plan is an annual requirement of Directive 074, which will allow the [AER] to continuously monitor 
tailings operations and provide a means to take enforcement action when necessary. Compliance with the two 
main Directive 074 criteria (fines capture and DDA strength) is to be measured by companies annually start-
ing in 2011. Additional reporting is required on the fluid tailings content of each pond annually and is 
scheduled to be submitted along with the annual tailings plan to the [AER] by September 30 of each year.” 
ERCB Press Release, supra note 13 at 2. 
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proved each plan.32 Of the five different companies, only Suncor’s plan is in substantial 
compliance with Directive 074.33 
Under Suncor’s plan, the company will comply with the Directive until 2018, which 
is when Suncor plans to relocate tailings material as part of the TRO process and de-
commission portions of the reclamation facility.34 As a result of these operational 
changes, Suncor will not meet the Directive’s requirements between 2018 and 2020.35 
Thus, even Suncor anticipates a lapse in the regulatory requirements concerning timely 
reclamation of its tailings. 
Despite this gap, one environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) has 
suggested that Suncor “raises the bar for all companies operating in the oil sands, and it 
is essential that other oil sands companies are required to meet the new rules to deal 
with toxic tailings waste.”36 By the same token, Gail Henderson, an assistant professor 
at the University of Alberta Faculty of Law, argues the development of TRO demon-
strates that private industries “can extract and process natural resources so as to better 
preserve the surrounding environment” when they are given the right incentives.37 
 The reason for this adulation is likely because the AER has been even more flexi-
ble in approving the plans of Suncor’s competitors.38 One report found that: Canadian 
Natural Resources Limited will not be compliant with the Directive prior to 2025,  
Imperial Oil Resources Ventures Limited will not meet the Directive until 2023; and 
Shell will not comply under its plan before 2019 in regard to one tailings pond and 2027 
for another.39  
                                                                                                                                            
32 Energy Resources Conservation Board, News Release, 2010-20, “AER Conditional Approval of Final Two 
Tailings Plans Ends Initial Phase of Directive 074” (17 December 2010), online: AER 
<http://www.aer.ca/documents/news-releases/NR2010-20.pdf> [“AER Conditional Approval”]. 
33 Simieritsch, Obad & Dyer, supra note 29 at 30-31. Note that Fort Hill’s plan is also substantially compliant 
(Suncor acquired the Fort Hills project from the merger with Petro Canada in 2009) Ibid at 21. 
34 Suncor Energy Inc, “DDA Plan Prepared in Accordance with Directive 074 – Appendix C” (January 2009), 
online: AER <http://www.aer.ca/documents/oilsands/tailings-
plans/Suncor_20100129_DDAPlanSubmission.pdf> at 16. 
35 “AER Conditional Approval”, supra note 32.  
36 Simon Dyer, “Pembina reacts to Suncor’s proposed new tailings technology” The Pembina Institute (23 Octo-
ber 2009), online: The Pembina Institute <http://www.pembina.org>. 
37 Gail E Henderson, “Rawls & Sustainable Development” (2011) 7 JSDLP 3 at 19-20. 
38 Andrew Leach, “Oilsands Debate in Edmonton Centre” (19 April 2011), online: Rescuing the frog 
<http://www.andrewleach.ca>. For an explanation of Suncor’s competitors tailings technology see Garth 
Parker, Arnie Olyan & Melanie Condic, “Oil Sands Extraction Technologies: Perception and Production” 
(2011), online: Gowlings <http://www.gowlings.com>. 
39 Simieritsch, Obad & Dyer, supra note 29 at 30-31. Syncrude’s initial plan expressly stated it would not 
demonstrate compliance with Directive 074, however this was revised and it is expected to reach compliance 
with Directive 074 in 2014. As stated by the AER (formerly the ERCB):  
The Syncrude plans as originally filed on September 30, 2009, did not fully meet…[AER] require-
ments. Subsequent consultations between Syncrude and the…[AER] have seen significant 
improvements to the company’s plans. The…[AER] has imposed conditions (see backgrounder) 
on Syncrude’s approval that will enable the company to meet and exceed Directive 074 require-
ments by 2014. 
Energy Resources Conservation Board, News Release, 2010 “ERCB Approves Fort Hills and Syncrude 
Tailings Pond Plans with Conditions” (23 April 2010), online: AER <http://www.aer.ca/documents/news-
releases/NR2010-05.pdf>. 
At the time the AER (formerly the ERCB) granted the conditional approval to Syncrude one commentator 
stated succinctly that “the regulator approved a plan by a company that clearly stated it would not meet the 
regulations.” Dan Woynillowicz, “When it comes to enforcing its regulations, is the ERCB more bark than 
bite?” The Pembina Institute (25 August 2010), online: The Pembina Institute <http://www.pembina.org>.  
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In effect, the AER exempts these companies from the Directive for many years to 
come. This suggests that Suncor’s TRO plan goes further than the company is required 
to go under current law. Suncor is complying with Directive 074 and developing TRO 
as an effective strategy to meet existing regulations; however, in practice, the AER has 
not required oil sands operators to strictly comply with Directive 074. Thus, given that 
TRO is expensive to implement and that it may not be necessary to meet current legal 
obligations, Suncor’s strategy would appear unreasonable from a cost savings perspec-
tive. This is particularly true if one accepts that the primary rationales for going forward 
with TRO are the benefits to the environment and corporate reputation.  
In light of the AER’s failure to enforce Directive 074, it is unclear what incentives 
Suncor has to continue with its robust TRO program, absent those mandated by law. In 
2012, Suncor announced a review of company spending to “wrangle back costs and 
boost profits.”40 Hypothetically, if the cost of TRO implementation continues to esca-
late and if Suncor’s directors deem the costs of TRO superfluous, then it is possible the 
program could be suspended or cut back. Conversely, Suncor’s directors could choose 
to proceed with TRO’s implementation notwithstanding the impact this would have on 
the company’s immediate profitability. 
This case study posits a hypothetical situation involving the future of TRO: what if 
Suncor’s TRO process proves to be effective from an environmental standpoint, yet 
becomes more costly from a financial perspective than Suncor either anticipates or is 
willing to pay when one takes the company’s profitability into account?41 
In this scenario, Suncor’s directors must choose between two options in accord-
ance with their statutory fiduciary duties. Firstly, the directors can increase or maintain 
expenditures on TRO in order to meet the 10-year commitment as pledged in the Sus-
tainability Report. Alternatively, the company can limit projected expenditure on TRO 
for financial reasons and, in doing so, fail to meet the 10-year target for reclaiming a 
tailings surface suitable for revegetation.  
This hypothetical scenario assumes that Suncor will experience decreased liquidity 
to support operations such as TRO implementation and development. The reasons for 
this decrease in revenue may be attributed to increased costs, dropping oil prices, or 
both. Suncor previously acknowledged the risks associated with escalating costs for 
TRO implementation.42 Moreover, in 2013 there were reports that Suncor investors had 
grown impatient with the company’s stock valuation after falling by 40% in two years.43 
                                                                                                                                            
40 Nathan VanderKlippe, “Suncor pulls back on growth ambitions” The Globe and Mail (25 July 2012), online: 
The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
41 The future of TRO is merely considered in this example for the purposes of testing legal liability for repre-
sentations made in a corporate sustainability report and not based on the scientific merit behind TRO 
technology and prospects. The goal is not to impugn Suncor with negative assumptions, however the possibil-
ity exists that TRO technology may not effectively streamline the reclamation process as quickly or in a cost 
effective fashion as the Sustainability Report suggests. 
42 See the 2011 Suncor Annual Information Form:  
There are risks associated specifically with our ability to reclaim tailings ponds containing mature 
fine tailings with TROTM or other methods and technologies. Suncor expects that TROTM will 
help the company reclaim existing tailings ponds by reducing tailings. The success of TROTM or 
any other methods or technology and the time to reclaim tailings ponds could increase or decrease 
our decommissioning and restoration cost estimates. Our failure or inability to adequately imple-
ment our reclamation plans, including our planned implementation of TROTM, could have a 
material adverse effect on Suncor’s business, financial condition, results of operations and cash 
flow. 
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Lastly, this scenario assumes that the AER would grant an extension on the 
timeframe to complete the TRO process, ensuring Suncor’s costs do not escalate as it 
endeavours to meet the projected end date of 2020–2021. However, while Suncor 
would still be compliant with Alberta regulations, this result would violate certain prom-
ises contained in the Sustainability Report, namely that TRO would accelerate overall 
mine reclamation efforts by drying “tailings into a material solid enough to be reclaimed 
in a fraction of the time that earlier technologies require.”44 
The question now is not whether Suncor would be in breach of environmental reg-
ulations, but whether Suncor’s directors would be in breach of their statutory fiduciary 
duties in light of the company’s statements in the Sustainability Report. With falling 
corporate profits, high costs, uncertain outcomes, and few regulatory requirements for 
its implementation, should Suncor continue with the TRO program, despite monetary 
constraints? 
Suncor has different groups of stakeholders with different interests in the corpora-
tion. On one hand, there are socially-minded shareholders like ethical investment funds 
and ENGOs.45 Such groups may launch an action under the CBCA to enforce a volun-
tary sustainability policy.46 On the other hand, the remaining stakeholders include 
profit-driven shareholders that prefer the maximization of shareholder wealth.47 Both 
these types of investors exist outside the scope of this hypothetical case study. 
This case study confronts the following two issues:  
 
1) What are the legal implications if Suncor’s directors decide to apply 
further funding to fulfil the Sustainability Report pledges at the ex-
pense of shareholder profit?  
2) Under Canadian corporate law, can profit-driven shareholders hold 
the directors to account for promoting an environmental interest that 
is not otherwise required by existing regulations? 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Suncor Energy Inc, 2011 Annual Information Form (1 March 2012), online: Suncor Energy Inc 
<http://www.suncor.com/pdf/Suncor_AIF_2012_en.pdf> at 59. Further: “Suncor may provide cost esti-
mates for major projects at the conceptual stage, prior to commencement or completion of the final scope 
design and detailed engineering necessary to reduce the margin of error of such cost estimates. Accordingly, 
actual costs can vary from estimates, and these differences can be material.” Ibid at 62. 
43 Tim Shufelt, “Buffett bets on Suncor and oil sands” The Globe and Mail (15 August 2013), online: The Globe 
and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
44 2010 Report on Sustainability, supra note 8. 
45 NEI Investments is one example. See NEI Investments, About Ethical Funds (2 August 2 2010), online: NEI 
Investments <http://www.neiinvestments.com>. Suncor has been held in two of NEI’s funds: the Ethical 
Growth Fund and the Ethical Balanced Fund. 
46 The most likely scenario is that the stakeholder would use the oppression remedy. The oppression remedy is 
the mechanism by which stakeholders pursue a claim against a corporation or its directors for breaching 
‘reasonable expectations’ under section 241 of the CBCA. The court has wide latitude of discretion in deter-
mining what is reasonable. Once the claimant has established its reasonable expectation, the claimant must 
demonstrate that the corporation’s failure to meet that expectation caused oppression, unfairness or prejudice 
of the claimant’s interest. Oppression claims in Canada can be asserted against a corporation or any of its 
affiliates including directors, officers, or employees of the company. However, the claimant would still have to 
show the conduct at issue was corporate conduct, as opposed to personal. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Puri 
Poonam, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially Considered: 1995-2001” (2004) 30 Queen’s LJ 79. 
47 For instance, in August 2013 one of the world’s “foremost” investors, Warren Buffett, financed a $620-
million investment in Suncor. Shufelt, supra note 43. 
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To answer these questions, one must turn to the law of corporate accountability. 
Corporate accountability focuses on the considerations that directors must take into 
account when making decisions based on the best interests of the corporation.48 The 
considerations that directors may or must consider are directly connected to statutory 
fiduciary duties as contained in the CBCA. 
2. STATUTORY FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 
Before the enactment of the CBCA the best interests of a corporation were consid-
ered analogous to the best interests of current and future shareholders.49 American law 
has also primarily interpreted “the best interests of the corporation” as synonymous 
with maximizing shareholders’ wealth.50 In the famous 1919 case of Dodge v Ford Motor 
Co, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “[a] business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end.”51 Similarly, in Revlon v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, a 
1986 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, the court said that directors have a duty 
to maximize shareholder value once the sale of a company is inevitable.52 However, the 
idea that directors’ fiduciary duties are directed to the best interests of the corporation, 
rather than individual stakeholders, predates the CBCA by almost a century.53 
The notion that corporate directors may only consider the interests of current and 
future shareholders is commonly known as the shareholder primacy model of corpo-
rate accountability.54 Some commentators have declared that shareholder primacy is the 
                                                                                                                                            
48 Corporate accountability embodies the obligations of corporate directors towards stakeholders. Conversely, 
some have described corporate accountability by defining the substantive legal rights stakeholders have in 
relation to a board of directors. The Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission, The New Balance 
Sheet: Corporate Profits and Responsibility in the 21st Century (2002) at 2-5, as reported in Michael Kerr et al, Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Legal Analysis (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2009) at 28 [Kerr]. 
49 See Martin v Gibson, [1907] 15 OLR 623 at 623, [1907] OJ No 85 (Ont HCJ). The holding in Martin was 
reflected in Parke v Daily News Ltd, [1962] 1 Ch 927 Ch D (Eng), an English case but nevertheless cited with 
approval in subsequent Canadian decisions. 
50 Mills Acquisition Co v Macmillan Inc, 559 A 2d 1261 at 1282, n 29 (Del 1989). 
51 Dodge v Ford Motor Co, (1919) 204 Mich 459 at 684, 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919). 
52 Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A 2d 173 at 182 (Del 1986). 
53 As stated in 1883 by the British Lord Bowen in Hutton v West Cork Railway, “[t]he law does not say that there 
are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of 
the company.” (1883), 23 Ch D 654 at 673 Ch D (Eng). 
54 Early developments of the shareholder primacy model begin with Ronald Coase. Ronald Coase, “The 
Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386. Michael Jensen and William Meckling advocated the agency 
theory of shareholder primacy whereby the shareholders should receive the benefits of the corporation as the 
principals in an agency relationship. Michael Jensen & William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. The 
shareholder primacy model was supported by Milton Friedman who said: “[The] Responsibilities [of directors] 
is to conduct the business in accordance with the desires [of shareholders], which generally will be to make as 
much money as possible.” Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of the Corporation is to Increase its 
Profits” (1970) New York Times Magazine (13 September 1970), online: University of Michigan 
<http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf> at 1. 
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“end of corporate law” as a final answer in explaining the function of a corporation.55 
However, other commentators have recently argued shareholder primacy “is, at best, 
premature, and, at worst, incorrect.”56 An alternative view to shareholder primacy sup-
ports a stakeholder model of corporate accountability, which asserts that directors 
should consider various interests beyond those of the shareholders.57 
In Canada, the law of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties is set out in section 
122(1) of the CBCA.58 It states: 
122(1)  Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers 
and discharging their duties shall 
(a)  act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the  
corporation; and 
(b)  exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person 
would exercise in comparable circumstances.59 
The CBCA is the federal legislative approach to corporate law in Canada, and the 
provinces have all adopted essentially similar legislation.60 The CBCA does not define in 
precise terms what “the best interests of the corporation” means. Therefore, this task 
has been left to judicial interpretation. 
The following section reviews the most recent and prominent decisions involving 
an interpretation of section 122(1) of the CBCA by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
including Peoples and BCE.61 These judgments are then applied to the case study con-
cerning the legal impacts of corporate environmental pledges in Part 3. 
                                                                                                                                            
55 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89 Geo LJ 439 at 
441. 
56 Leonard Rotman, “Debunking the ‘End of History’ Thesis for Corporate Law” (2010) 33 BC Int’l & Comp 
L Rev 219 at 268. This debate has been canvassed elsewhere in academic literature. See Merrick E Dodd, “For 
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1145; Adolf Augustus Berle Jr & Gardiner 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (New York: Macmillan, 1993). 
57 For academic sources supporting a stakeholder model of corporate accountability see Margaret Blair & 
Lynn Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85 Va L Rev 248 on the Team Produc-
tion Model. Also see Cynthia Williams, “Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency” (1998) 
76 NCL Rev 1265 at 1382-83 on enlightened shareholder value. For further information on the stakeholder 
model and various theories of corporate accountability, see Jeffrey Bone, “Legal Perspectives on Corporate 
Responsibility: Contractarian or Communitarian Thought?” (2011) 24(2) Can JL & Jur 277. 
58 This was the work of the reforms introduced by the Dickerson Committee, an advisory body charged with 
the task of reforming and modernizing Canadian corporate law. See Mohamed Khimji, “Peoples v Wise – 
Conflating Directors Duties, Oppression, and Stakeholder Protection” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev 209 at 212. The 
committee presented its findings in the Dickerson Report. Robert Dickerson, John Howard & Leon Getz, 
Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (The Dickerson Report), vol 1 Commentary; vol 2 Draft 
Canada Business Corporations Act (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971). 
59 CBCA, supra note 9. 
60 Professor Welling wrote: “The CBCA variation on the Ontario initiative swept the country. Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, new Brunswick, Ontario Yukon, and Newfoundland adopted statutes remarkably 
similar to the CBCA.” Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles, 3d ed (Queensland: 
Scribblers, 2006) at 56. Further, New Zealand and several Caribbean countries have also enacted corporate 
statutes as variations of the CBCA. Ibid at 57. 
61 It is generally accepted that Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 28, [2004] 3 SCR 461 
[Peoples] and BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE] are the leading cases on 
section 122(1) of the CBCA. For Peoples see Catherine Francis, “Peoples Department Stores Inc v Wise: The 
Expanded Scope of Directors’ and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duties of Care” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 175; 
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Peoples and BCE 
Peoples arose from the acquisition of Peoples Department Store by a competitor and 
the implementation of a joint procurement policy between the two entities.62 Interpret-
ing section 122(1) of the CBCA, the Supreme Court of Canada said that it “may be 
legitimate,” but not mandatory, for directors to consider the impact of a corporate 
decision on a particular group of stakeholders.63 The Court framed the statutory fiduci-
ary duty to consider “the best interests of the corporation” in permissive terms: 
We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether  
[directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it 
may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board 
of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.64 
The Court rejected the argument that directors owe statutory fiduciary duties to any 
particular corporate constituent, saying “it is clear that the phrase the ‘best interests of 
the corporation’ should be read not simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholders’.”65 
Instead, directors should seek to create “a ‘better’ corporation, and not to favour the 
interest of any one group of stakeholders.”66 
It was in Peoples that the Supreme Court first formally approved the business judg-
ment rule.67 This rule developed as a common law doctrine that permits courts to defer 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Darcy MacPherson, “The Supreme Court Restates Directors’ Fiduciary Duty – A Comment on Peoples 
Department Stores v Wise” (2006) 43 Alta L Rev 383; Stéphane Rousseau, “Director’s Duty of Care after 
Peoples: Would it Be Wise to Start Worrying about Liability?” 41 (2005) Can Bus LJ 223; Wayne Gray, “A 
Solicitor’s Perspective on Peoples v Wise” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 184; and for BCE see “Symposium on the 
Supreme Court’s BCE Judgment” 48 Can Bus LJ No 2 which includes: Mohammad Fadel, “BCE and the 
Long Shadow of American Corporate Law” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 190; Jeremy Fraiberg, “Fiduciary Outs and 
Maximizing Shareholder Value Following BCE” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 213; Jeffrey MacIntosh, “BCE and The 
Peoples’ Corporate Law: Learning to Live on Quicksand” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 255; Edward Iacobucci, 
“Indeterminacy and The Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties” (2009) 48 Can 
Bus LJ 232; and James Tory, “A Comment on BCE Inc” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 287. 
62 The decision dates back to 1992 when the Wise brothers (Wise) purchased Peoples Department Store Inc. 
(Peoples) by way of a share purchase agreement. The brothers become shareholders and directors for both 
companies. According to the terms of this agreement, Peoples could not amalgamate with Wise until payment 
of the purchase price in full. The amortization period on the purchase price was originally eight years, and 
during that time Wise had to abide by strict covenants concerning the financial management of the corpora-
tion. On account of these covenants and given the fact the corporations were operating in financial turmoil, 
Wise implemented a joint inventory procurement policy, which had the effect of ultimately indebting Peoples 
to Wise. Subsequently both entities went into receivership. The allegation of the Trustee in bankruptcy was 
that Wise had favoured their own interests to the detriment of the creditors’ interests in Peoples. The Su-
preme Court held that the directors of Peoples, mainly the Wise brothers did not contravene section 122(1) of 
the CBCA in arranging the joint inventory procurement policy. Peoples, supra note 61. 
63 Ibid at para 42. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid at para 47. In previous case law on this point, the court also said directors should attempt to make the 
company a “better corporation.” See 820099 Ontario Inc v Harold E Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 123 (Ont Ct 
(Gen Div)), aff’d (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 (Ont Div Ct) at para 171. 
67 See in Peoples, supra note 61 at para 65, where regarding the business judgment rule the court quotes 
with favour Maple Leaf:  
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to the directors’ business judgment as long as an appropriate amount of prudence, dili-
gence, and reasonableness was used in making their decision.68 
Four years after Peoples, the Supreme Court of Canada augmented this standard in 
BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders by linking directors’ fiduciary duties with “fairness” and 
good corporate citizenship.69 The BCE decision concerned the privatization of BCE 
Inc. and Bell Canada (BCE), which would have transferred corporate ownership to a 
syndicate of private equity investors led by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board.70 
This would have significantly devalued existing bonds of the corporation.71  
The salient legal issues in BCE were the fiduciary duties of directors, the applica-
tion of the business judgment rule, and the doctrine of corporate citizenship. The Court 
held that directors have a fiduciary obligation toward the corporation itself. If there is a 
conflict between the corporation, shareholders, and other stakeholders, “the directors’ 
duty is clear—it is to the corporation.”72 The Court restated its ruling in Peoples that the 
interests of the corporation include a consideration of several corporate constituents 
                                                                                                                                            
 
The court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a perfect decision. Pro-
vided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute its 
opinion for that of the board even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s 
determination. As long as the directors have selected one of several reasonable alternatives, defer-
ence is accorded to the board’s decision. 
See Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp (sub nom Maple Leaf Foods Inc v Schneider Corp) (1998), CanLII 
5121 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (Ont CA) at paras 35-36. While Maple Leaf considers section 134(1)(a) of the 
Ontario Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B16. (OBCA), the language in the OBCA is virtually verbatim to 
the CBCA, and Maple Leaf has been cited enumerable times in relation to the interpretation of section 122(1) 
of the CBCA. Canadian cases had previously adopted a ‘proper purpose test’ under the business judgment rule 
that shifts the burden to directors to demonstrate their actions are consistent with the best interest of the 
company. 
68 See Exco Corporation v Nova Scotia Savings & Loan Company (1987), 35 BLR 149, 78 NSR (2d) 81, (NSSC 
(TD)) and Re 347883 Alberta Ltd and Producers Pipelines Inc (1991), 80 DLR (4th) 359, 92 Sask R 81, (Sask CA). 
69 BCE, supra note 61 at paras 71 & 81. While the context of the BCE decision concerns fundamental change 
of control scenarios, the decision has a general application on directors’ fiduciary duties towards stakeholders. 
See Peer Zumbansen & Simon Archer, “The BCE Decision: Reflections on the Firm as a Contractual Organi-
zation” (2008) CLPE Research Chapter 17/2008 vol 04 No 04. 
70 The privatization under the proposed consortium of owners would have seen the syndicate invest $8 billion 
of capital and required an additional $30 billion of new BCE debt. Jim Middlemiss, “BCE ruling good news 
for boards”, Financial Post (20 December 2008) FP6. 
71 In 2008, BCE commenced litigation against the consortium for breach of contract in the amount of $1.2 
billion. In May 2008, the Québec Court of Appeal (QCA) ruled in favour of the holders of Bell Canada 
debentures (Bondholders) in permitting the use of the CBCA oppression remedy to challenge the BCE plan 
of arrangement. The shareholders initially approved this plan in September 2007. The Bondholders’ argu-
ments were threefold: (1) the privatization of BCE converted investment grade debt into junk bonds; (2) the 
plan of arrangement was not fair and reasonable; and (3) the BCE directors had not appropriately considered 
the Bondholders’ interests. In their written decision, the QCA focused on the representations and understand-
ings between BCE and the Bondholders which fell outside the scope of the trust indenture. The QCA held 
that BCE had continually assured the Bondholders that the investment grade rating of the bonds would 
continue. By entering the proposed transaction BCE had failed in this commitment. This case was destined 
for the Supreme Court of Canada, and in the spring of 2008 the Supreme Court granted leave to hear the 
appeal and subsequently overturned the QCA decision. Given that the subject matter of BCE was a time 
sensitive issue concerning a very large and pending commercial transaction, the case stratospherically went 
from a Superior Court trial decision to submissions before the Supreme Court of Canada in just over three 
months. Note that the deal was eventually terminated in December 2008 because the Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan Board was unable to obtain a professional accounting opinion on the solvency of the proposed 
transaction. BCE, supra note 61. 
72 Ibid at para 37. 
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such as shareholders, creditors, suppliers, governments, consumers, employees, and the 
environment.73 Furthermore, the court interprets “the best interests of the corporation” 
as being “the long-term interests of the corporation.”74  
Conspicuously, the court held that directors are entitled to significant deference 
from the judiciary by applying the business judgment rule: 
Courts should give appropriate deference to the business judgment of direc-
tors who take into account these ancillary interests, as reflected by the 
business judgment rule. The “business judgment rule” accords deference to a 
business decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable alternatives.75 
When directors must balance conflicting corporate interests, the Court held that “it 
falls to the directors of the corporation to resolve them in accordance with their fiduci-
ary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate 
citizen.”76 Good corporate citizenship suggests there is a need for directors to “treat 
individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and fairly.”77  
In BCE, the Court does not articulate a precise legal test or framework for corpo-
rate citizenship. It only suggests that the obligation is linked with treating individual 
stakeholders equitably and fairly when the directors consider conflicting interests.78 BCE 
introduced the unprecedented notion of the “good corporate citizen” to Canadian cor-
porate law.79 This development builds on the analysis in Peoples, highlighting the 
willingness of the Supreme Court to defer to directors’ judgment. As a result, directors 
have discretion in choosing how to best integrate corporate social responsibility into 
corporate decision-making. In other words, they are free to make long-term sustainabil-
ity decisions without fearing prospective litigation by shareholders who seek to 
                                                                                                                                            
73 Ibid at para 39. 
74 Ibid at para 38. 
75 Ibid at para 40. The court went on to say at para 84: 
There is no principle that one set of interests—for example the interests of shareholders—should 
prevail over another set of interests. Everything depends on the particular situation faced by the 
directors and whether, having regard to that situation, they exercised business judgment in a re-
sponsible way. 
76 Ibid at para 81. Note that in regard to the oppression remedy, the Supreme Court defined this obligation as a 
“responsible corporate citizen” as opposed to a “good corporate citizen.” Ibid at para 82. 
77 Ibid at para 82. When the court addressed the meaning of the good corporate citizen in paragraph 66 it said: 
Directors, acting in the best interests of the corporation, may be obliged to consider the impact of 
their decisions on corporate stakeholders, such as the debentureholders in these appeals. This is 
what we mean when we speak of a director being required to act in the best interests of the corpo-
ration viewed as a good corporate citizen. 
Ibid at para 66. The statement above from the Supreme Court suggests that the need to consider the interests 
of non-shareholders is corollary to good corporate citizenship. The court defined ‘fair treatment’ as “funda-
mental to the reasonable expectation of stakeholders.” Ibid at para 36. The court explains the expectation of 
fair treatment in this manner: “The corporation and shareholders are entitled to maximize profit and share 
value, to be sure, but not by treating individual stakeholders unfairly.” Ibid at para 64. 
78 One commentator has suggested that corporate citizenship is the court attempting to reach a larger audi-
ence with an obiter dicta statement that acknowledges the growing trend of corporate social responsibility. 
Sarah P Bradley, “BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders: The new fiduciary duties of fair treatment, statutory compli-
ance, and good corporate citizenship” (2010) 41 Ottawa L Rev 325 at 347. 
79 See Jeffrey Bone, “The Supreme Court Revisiting Corporate Accountability: BCE Inc in search of a legal 
construct known as the ‘Good Corporate Citizen’” (2010) Alta L Rev, online: Alberta Law Review Supple-
ment <http://www.albertalawreview.com>. 
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maximize short-term returns.80 However, good corporate citizenship is always tempered 
by the practical application of the business judgment rule, which allows directors to 
ultimately decide what is in the best interests of the corporation.  
Peoples and BCE have had two main effects. Firstly, the business judgment rule cre-
ates a strong presumption in favour of the board of directors and corporate officers. As 
long as decisions are reached in good faith and with the care that a prudent person in 
similar circumstances would exercise, courts will defer to the directors. The directors 
need only behave in a manner that they reasonably believe is in the best interests of the 
corporation on an informed basis. 
Secondly, the decisions in Peoples and BCE expand the list of stakeholders that di-
rectors may legitimately consider in ascertaining the best interests of the corporation. 
These leading cases seem to accept a more expansive role for corporate directors in the 
pursuit of socially responsible corporate objectives.81 Thus, the Supreme Court’s objec-
tive in writing BCE and Peoples can be interpreted as encouraging corporate directors to 
make decisions based on social values, rather than purely economic interests.  
Working Hypothesis for the Case Study 
Given these findings, the working hypothesis for the case study is that a corporate 
board of directors may determine for itself whether to adopt environmental principles 
such as those contained in a voluntary corporate sustainability pledge. These promises 
might, for example, focus on ameliorating the impacts of the corporation on the envi-
ronment. Directors may also embrace these same environmental objectives in a sustain-
ability pledge if, in their view, they reasonably believe it will improve the long-term 
financial position of their shareholders. In this sense, directors may advance the same 
environmental goals for long-term profit-driven motives, effective corporate citizenship, 
or both.82 Still, directors will not be held accountable for failing to achieve environmen-
tal pledges, as corporate directors are not legally mandated to consider environmental 
principles under section 122(1) of the CBCA.  
                                                                                                                                            
80 Note that the preceding eight paragraphs are in part reprinted from Jeffrey Bone, “The Consideration of 
Sustainability by Corporate Directors” (2013) 26 J Envtl L & Prac 1. 
81 To put BCE in context, this shift has occurred in other jurisdictions. For instance, the fiduciary duties of 
directors in the U.K. requires them to “promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as 
a whole” by taking into account the long-term considerations of employees, suppliers, customers, the com-
munity and the environment, among others. Companies Act (UK), 2006, c 46, s 172(1). 
82 These interests are not necessarily incongruent:  
Recent years have seen a growth in the voluntary adoption of sustainability reporting in response 
to both stakeholders concerned with social and environmental performance and investors that rely 
on this type of non-financial data as an indicator of underlying corporate risks and likely future fi-
nancial performance. 
Ans Kolk & Paolo Perego, “Determinants of the Adoption of Sustainability Assurance Statements: An Inter-
national Investigation” (2010) 19 Business Strategy and the Environment 182, online: Social Science Research 
Network <http://www.ssrn.com> at 3. 
86 CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY PLEDGES IN THE ALBERTA OIL SANDS Vol. 23 
!
3. APPLICATION OF STATUTORY FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO THE CASE STUDY 
This case study applies the analysis of section 122(1) of the CBCA from above to 
the 2010 Report on Sustainability of Suncor and issues surrounding the reclamation of 
tailings ponds in the Alberta oil sands. The working hypothesis is that directors are not 
required to fulfil sustainability pledges, but they have the discretion to implement the 
promises contained in a pledge, considering the leading case law on section 122(1) of 
the CBCA. 
Using the scenario explained in Part 1, this case study asks the following questions: 
what is the legal effect if Suncor’s directors break their Sustainability Report pledges 
concerning the anticipated reclamation timeline? Does reneging on the stated expecta-
tions contained in the Sustainability Report create legal liability for Suncor’s directors 
under section 122(1) the CBCA?  
Alternatively, assume the directors decide to meet the deadline by increasing fund-
ing of the TRO program at the expense of shareholder wealth. This decision would 
result in greater spending on TRO, which in turn cuts into shareholder profit margins.83 
The reason the directors decide to perform above compliance with Directive 074 is to 
meet the standards contained in the Sustainability Report.84 In this type of situation, are 
the directors in breach of section 122(1) of the CBCA because extra funding for TRO 
violates the expectations of profit-driven shareholders? 
Option 1: The directors break the pledges from the Sustainability Report  
concerning the anticipated reclamation timeline  
Under either option, the directors would have to make a decision between the rea-
sonable expectations of two groups of shareholders with divergent interests. On the one 
hand, a socially-minded shareholder has ethical interests in the corporation, such as 
reducing the company’s environmental and social impacts. On the other hand, a profit-
driven shareholder is interested in maximizing profits to the exclusion of other interests. 
From this perspective, a decision that results in Suncor’s failure to live up to the expec-
tations of the Sustainability Report is a decision in favour of profit maximization. 
In order to enforce the pledges in the Sustainability Report, a socially-minded 
claimant would have to successfully argue that the directors of Suncor breached their 
fiduciary duties to manage the environmental interests of corporate stakeholders along 
with the financial implications of the TRO program. That position would be difficult 
since directors can arguably permit the TRO process to continue past the express time-
                                                                                                                                            
83 For the purposes of this case study, the article uses the definition of ‘shareholder wealth’ as put forward by 
Milton Friedman. Friedman, supra note 54. 
84 It is important to note that Suncor has a select committee of directors that considers sustainability and 
environmental issues. The Environment, Health, Safety and Sustainable Development Committee (EHS&SD) 
reviews the company’s effectiveness in meeting Suncor’s obligations under the Sustainability Report. As per its 
mandate, the committee is responsible for reviewing Suncor’s “Sustainability Report or other significant 
reports…[and to] [r]eview with legal counsel any legal matters having a significant impact on the EHS&SD 
reports.” Suncor Energy Inc, Mandate of Suncor’s Environment, Health, Safety and Sustainable Development Committee 
(1 February 2011), online: Suncor <http://www.suncor.com/pdf/ehs_mandate_Feb2011.pdf>. Further, The 
Chief Operating Officer holds “top executive responsibility for sustainable issues.” Annual Report, supra note 
15 at 68. 
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line of the Sustainability Report when one considers the aggregate interests of the cor-
poration as a whole. 
This is a matter of discretion for directors and reflects the deference accorded to 
the business judgment rule. As such, it becomes a question of whether the directors’ 
decision to permit the company to break the pledges contained within the Sustainability 
Policy is “within a range of reasonable alternatives” that the directors considered.85 As 
long as the decision was reached in good faith, with care and in a manner that the Sun-
cor directors reasonably believe is in the best interest of the corporation as a whole, 
then the directors of Suncor would not be in breach of their fiduciary duties for reneg-
ing on the timelines of the TRO program.86 
 On account of the business judgment rule, corporate directors are allowed to 
maintain the clandestine nature of boardroom decisions. The decision-making process 
can remain opaque without the benefit of objective and transparent accountability. 
Instead, directors can simply appeal to a broad standard of reasonableness in defending 
executive decisions.  
For a socially-minded shareholder, to succeed in a claim of this nature requires un-
equivocal reasoning that continuing with TRO is the only prudent option given the 
directors’ duty to manage stakeholder interests as a good corporate citizen. This likely 
requires more egregious action by Suncor’s directors beyond failing to fulfil the expecta-
tions concerning TRO in the Sustainability Report. It requires a socially-minded 
shareholder to prove that Suncor’s directors were somehow misguided in breaching the 
Sustainability Report, or that they did so in bad faith. Such a conclusion seems unlikely, 
if not impossible, given the directors’ deeply rooted obligation to consider shareholder 
profit as part of the company’s best interests and their broad discretion to judge the best 
interests of the business. 
Option 2: The directors approve an increase in funding for the TRO program in 
order to meet the timelines contained in the Sustainability Report 
Under this option the directors of Suncor decide to increase expenditures on the 
TRO program at the expense of maximizing corporate profit (which equates to share-
holder wealth). The reason the directors decide to reach beyond baseline compliance 
with Directive 074 is to meet the standards contained within the voluntary Sustainability 
Report. In such a situation, would the directors be in breach of section 122(1) of the 
CBCA? Would this breach result in legal liability if profit-driven shareholders object to 
the directors’ decision? 
It appears from the decisions in Peoples and BCE that Canadian law allows directors 
to consider community and public interests in determining the best interest of the cor-
poration. Presumably, fulfilling the mandate of the Sustainability Report preserves the 
                                                                                                                                            
85 BCE, supra note 61 at para 40. 
86 The application of the business judgment rule depends on whether the directors reached a sound conclu-
sion in permitting an extension to the TRO program due to financial constraints. This depends on the 
treatment the directors gave to each independent corporate stakeholder and how the directors ultimately 
balanced those interests. It is more a concern about process and diligence beyond the actual conclusion and 
decision that the directors reach. 
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concept of social license, which is one aspect of corporate citizenship.87 Further, the 
continuation of the pledges made in the Sustainability Report likely builds trust between 
Suncor, its regulators, impacted communities, and stakeholders that benefit from TRO.  
In Peoples, and subsequently in BCE, the Court was clear that the best interests of 
the corporation should be read “not simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholder’” 
and lists governments, the environment, and consumers among other stakeholder inter-
ests that directors may consider.88 As such, Peoples endorses the view that Suncor 
directors may decide whether to fulfil the pledges contained in the Sustainability Report 
by having regard to the environmental impacts and other extrinsic interests that direc-
tors can but are not required to consider pursuant to environmental regulations such as 
Directive 074. 
Finally, BCE states that when dealing with conflicting stakeholder interests, direc-
tors should consider the concept of responsible corporate citizenship.89 As one 
commentator remarked on BCE, responsible corporate citizenship is the “hallmark” of 
fulfilling fiduciary duties.90 Arguably, this suggests that a responsible corporate citizen 
would uphold the objectives in a sustainability policy and make best efforts to imple-
ment this pledge. A responsible corporate citizen would devise expectations concerning 
their impacts on the environment, release information with transparency, and set 
achievable environmental goals. The statements made by a responsible corporate citizen 
in a sustainability policy would be realistic and based on sober analysis, as opposed to 
optimistic greenwashing, which is merely hyperbolic corporate advertising.91 
Thus, from a legal perspective, it appears that fulfilling the pledges contained in the 
Sustainability Report at the expense of shareholder profit is in keeping with the leading 
jurisprudence on point from the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting section 122(1) 
of the CBCA. Further, this research suggests that directors are protected from liability 
when they make a decision aligned with a sustainability pledge that also limits share-
holder value. For the reasons cited previously concerning the business judgment rule, 
directors need only invoke the rule to defend decisions made in good faith that support 
and preserve commitments to an environmental or sustainability pledge. As such, a 
profit-driven shareholder cannot hold Suncor directors to account for complying with 
the Sustainability Report despite the financial losses that may result. 
Moreover, one may argue that Suncor has an ethical obligation to press forward 
with its TRO program given the program’s potential. This decision may affect share-
holder profit; however, assuming there is still profit to be had, Suncor directors may 
balance stakeholder interests between monetary gain and environmental costs. This 
decision reflects the principle of good corporate citizenship as provided in BCE. Still, 
directors will not be held accountable for failing to adopt or achieve environmental 
pledges such as adhering to the TRO program. 
                                                                                                                                            
87 Essentially, the business receives it privileges from society: “mainly related to the legally institutionalized 
corporate personality…. [Therefore,] [s]ociety agrees with this exchange as long as the social benefits exceed 
the social costs.” Ronald Jeurissen, “Institutional Conditions of Corporate Citizenship” (2004) 53 Journal of 
Business Ethics 87 at 89. 
88 Peoples, supra note 61 at para 42. 
89 BCE, supra note 61 at para 82. 
90 Kerr, supra note 48. 
91 Miriam A Cherry & Judd F Sneirson, “Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster” (2010) 85 Tul L Rev 983. 
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There is increasing awareness that long-term sustainability initiatives are a good 
form of corporate risk management. Canadian corporate law has also increasingly ac-
cepted this view. In BCE, the Supreme Court defines the best interests of the corpora-
corporation as “the long-term interests of the corporation.”92 This trend towards long-
term thinking coincides with the rise of sustainability pledges among corporations, 
including Suncor’s Sustainability Report.93  
Even if the enactment of a corporate sustainability pledge is strictly voluntary or 
discretionary, prudent directors will insist on having these policies to ensure they meet 
their fiduciary obligations. From this perspective, sustainability concerns should be 
promoted to the strategic level of corporate governance.94 Making sustainability pledges 
is not an exercise in public relations or greenwashing, but an act that promotes risk 
management and profit-maximization. This case study suggests that voluntarily steps, 
such as adopting sustainability policies, will complement directors’ fiduciary duty to 
address long-term sufficiency and environmental concerns. Both of these goals are valid 
considerations for directors when exercising their statutory fiduciary duties. 
In summary, the Suncor case study illustrates that corporate sustainability pledges 
do not create legal liability for directors when one considers their statutory fiduciary 
duties in section 122(1) of the CBCA. However, directors acting on behalf of a corpora-
tion as a good corporate citizen are legally entitled to follow an environmental pledge in 
a sustainability report at the expense of shareholder profit.  
4. CONCLUSION 
The findings in this paper indicate that a sustainability pledge does not create legally 
binding obligations upon corporate directors. Firstly, established case law requires direc-
tors to consider the best interests of the corporation, which may include a diverse set of 
stakeholders’ interests. The BCE decision suggests that corporate directors have a legal 
obligation to make decisions as a good corporate citizen; however, this does not require 
directors to consider the interests of particular stakeholders. Therefore, a voluntary 
corporate sustainability pledge does not result in a legal obligation on directors to im-
plement environmental objectives contained in a sustainability pledge. Secondly, 
directors are shielded from liability when enforcing the objectives contained in a sus-
tainability pledge. While stakeholders may not be empowered to legally hold 
corporations to account on sustainability pledges, it remains within the discretion of 
directors to implement the objectives of a sustainability policy when they decide that it 
                                                                                                                                            
92 BCE, supra note 61 at para 38. 
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is in the best interests of the corporation to do so. The Suncor case study demonstrates 
that corporate directors are not legally required to follow the pledges contained within a 
sustainability report under current conditions. However, directors who voluntarily 
choose to follow the pledges in a corporate sustainability policy—to the detriment of 
short-term profit margins—will be able to do so without incurring liability on account 
of the business judgment rule. 
 
